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INTRODUCTION
This most recent addition to Carlos Vazquez's impressive body of
Eleventh Amendment scholarship is; like 'his earlier work, both learned
and provocative. As the doctrine in this field evolves, devolves, or self-
destructs so rapidly, depending on one's perspective, it is tremendously
helpful to be privy to the running commentary of such a keen and
watchful scholar.
In this paper, Vazquez asks: assuming the correctness of the Supreme
Court's current sovereign immunity doctrine, should treaties be treated
differently, from federal statutes when determining whether they
abrogate state sovereign immunity? This is a question that federal courts
scholars might consider rather narrow-a point I will return to later.' It
appears that the resonance of this question for those steeped in
international law, at first blush at least, is greater.
As law professors we are used to having questions posed to us with
certain assumptions appended, certain questions taken off the table. The
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. I wish to thank Curtis Bradley for conceiving of this
conference, and Cherif Bassiouni, Brian Havel, and Spencer Waller for their insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. See infra Part II.
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particular assumption from which Vazquez wishes to begin-that
current sovereign immunity doctrine is correct-I find a particularly
bitter pill to swallow, yet it would seem that accepting the assumption is
a useful way to focus on the question of treaties versus statutes. I will
begin by doing so, but later on I will suggest that the notion of a fixed
"sovereign immunity doctrine" is descriptively problematic. I will, also
suggest, and here I think Vazquez and I are in agreement, that the
narrow question about treaties cannot be usefully considered without
turning to the broader questions of the scope and correctness of current
sovereign immunity doctrine. Thus I will begin by considering the
question as posed: assuming the validity of current doctrine, should
treaties be treated like federal statutes when deciding whether they
abrogate sovereign immunity? I will then turn to the problems inherent
in the question posed.
I. THE POWER OF TREATIES TO ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY UNDER CURRENT DOCTRINE
Vazquez posits that, in light of current doctrine, the best argument for
according treaties broader power to abrogate sovereign immunity is
what he calls a "foreign affairs exceptionalism" argument, based on
Missouri v. Holland.2 He concludes that foreign affairs exceptionalism
is not justified in this case; that the Constitution treats statutes and
treaties the same with respect to remedies, and therefore that both
sources of power should be subject to the same constitutional limits on
their ability to abrogate.3 I will argue that one need not reach the
question of foreign affairs exceptionalism at all in order to justify
separate treatment of treaties.
Vazquez convincingly argues that the Holland case should be
understood as holding that the limits on congressional power found in
Article I section 8 are not applicable to Congress's treaty power, which
arises from a wholly separate source. He goes on to say, however, that
"[i]t does not follow that general limitations found elsewhere in the
Constitution do not apply to the Treaty Power."4 He concludes that
although the Founders were centrally concerned with enforcing state
compliance with treaties, the mechanisms they chose for doing so were
identical to those they chose for enforcing federal statutes: the
2. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
3. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713,
741 (2002).
4. Id. at 731.
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Supremacy Clause and Article III, neither of which distinguishes
statutes from treaties.5 Therefore, he argues, constitutional limitations
on the federal statutory power to abrogate must apply equally to the
treaty power.
But one does not have to join the fray about the proper interpretation
of Missouri v. Holland (and indeed one can wholly agree with
Vazquez's interpretation of Holland) to claim that this argument
misapprehends current sovereign immunity doctrine. The notion of a
generally applicable sovereign immunity doctrine is at odds with the
current doctrinal understanding, which is highly clause-bound.6 In
determining the scope of the abrogation power, it is essential to identify
the authority under which Congress acted in order to know whether its
attempt to subject the states to damage remedies is constitutional.7 That
is, Vazquez's insight about the meaning of Holland-that it simply held
that each source of Congressional power must be evaluated on its own
ters--is equally applicable to interpreting the scope of Congressional
power to abrogate sovereign immunity. Whereas major federal statutes
were once allowed the luxury of ambiguity about their precise source of
federal authority, the Seminole Tribe decision9 has made identification
of the source of Congressional power to abrogate crucial. Seminole
Tribe disallowed abrogation under the Commerce Power, and
reaffirmed Congress's power to abrogate under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" In short, it is no longer possible to discuss the
contours of a broad abrogation power without reference to the source of
the power to abrogate.
Vazquez approaches the clause-bound nature of abrogation as if it is
inapplicable to the treaty question because he characterizes current
doctrine as accepting the chronology argument. That is, he interprets
Seminole Tribe and its progeny to hold that only the Fourteenth
Amendment, or at least only constitutional provisions passed
subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment, may abrogate sovereign
immunity, and concludes that since the treaty power falls on the wrong
side of the divide, it cannot be used to abrogate." This is a defensible
5. Id. at 733.
6. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1259, 1260 (2001).
7. Id. at 1264.
8. See also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1317, 1339 n.76 (1999) (discussing differences in treaty and statute as sources of power).
9. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
10. Id. (reaffirming Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
11. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 726-27.
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interpretation of Seminole Tribe but by no means the only possible
interpretation. More significant, it conflicts with other important aspects
of the Court's current- approach to abrogation.
It is possible to read Seminole Tribe to stand for the broad proposition
that only constitutional amendments passed subsequent to the Eleventh
Amendment can override state sovereign immunity. The opinion
contains language disclaiming the relevance of the rationale of
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer to Commerce Clause suits, since "Fitzpatrick
cannot be read to justify limitation of the principle embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the
Constitution."' 2 But the fact that the Fitzpatrick decision, which after all
considered only the propriety of a Fourteenth Amendment claim, cannot
be relied on to justify an appeal to antecedent provisions does not mean
that the appeal cannot be justified.
Seminole Tribe can also be read to declare that Article I is no longer a
legitimate source of Congressional power for abrogating sovereign
immunity. It contains language that "Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction."' 3 As Professor Fletcher recently observed, however, this
language probably should not be taken literally, 4 given the possibility
of overriding sovereign immunity (albeit under a "waiver" rather than
an "abrogation" rationale) under the Spending Clause."
Seminole Tribe holds that the states shall be immune from
unconsenting suit, "save where there has been a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention." 6 Thus, the parceling out of
power at the time of the framing of the Constitution remains an
important inquiry. Alden v. Maine subsequently elaborated on this
principle, referring to the "settled doctrinal understanding... that
sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but
12. 517 U.S. at 66 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
13. Id. at 72.
14. William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 843, 853 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
waiver); Cherry v. University of Wisconsin System Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2001)
(same); Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that
waiver under Spending Clause may occur under the proper circumstances); see also Daniel J.
Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1011, 1064 n.2 11 (raising question of effect of Spending Power on sovereign immunity);
CHOPER, FALLON, KAMISAR & SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 1423 (9th
ed. 2001) (same).
16. 517 U.S. at 68 (internal quotations omitted).
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from the structure of the original Constitution itself."' 7 The Court went
on to explain that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than
established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; it follows
that the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by
the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit
in the constitutional design." 8 Nor, the Court in Alden made clear, is the
principle directly related to the scope of Article III power; it is a
separate and distinct structural principle inherent in our Constitutional
system of federalism. 9 In short, current abrogation doctrine seems to
demand an inquiry into the structural principles inherent in our
Constitutional system of federalism, and into exactly what notion of
state sovereignty was agreed upon in the plan of the convention. Given
the Court's repeated incantation of the "plan of the convention" and
"inherent structural principles," it is unfortunate that it has provided
little guidance about how these should be identified, apart from assuring
us that they should not be defined to include suit against unconsenting
states. Nevertheless, this is the task at hand.
Let me emphasize that I am striving at this point merely to describe
current doctrine. Many fine scathing critiques of the Court's reasoning
have been written, pointing out its manifold flaws.2" My point here is
simply that even accepting the Court's doctrinal scheme, even accepting
that it is coherent to speak of pre-existing states entering the Union with
and retaining a sweeping sovereignty,2' even accepting that this pre-
existing sovereignty is somehow immune from the great shifts of power
after the Civil War,22 it is still necessary to determine the current scope
of state sovereignty by examining the "structural principles inherent in
our system of federalism."23
Should the treaty power be equated with the Commerce Power as
identically placed in the structure of the Constitution? Returning to my
17. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).
18. Id. at 728-29.
19. Id. at 730.
20. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication:
The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953 (2000);
Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1127 (2001); Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 20, at 1153-55 (critiquing notion of pre-existing states
with sovereign power).
22. Jackson, supra note 6, at 1277 (arguing that the specifically enumerated powers of Article
I may, like Congress's Section Five powers, also be considered more broadly in light of later
enacted powers).
23. Id. See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 713-14.
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original point, one need not argue for treaty power exceptionalism in
order to maintain that the Treaty Power differs from the Commerce
Power in significant ways, and that each should be considered
separately. Indeed, I fear that the notion of treaty power exceptionalism
may become a distracting semantic red flag, disguising that much
narrower proposition. My aim here is not to prevail in the argument that
the Treaty Power should be treated differently from the Commerce
Power, but more narrowly to argue that Vazquez is incorrect to equate
them simply because both appear in the unamended Constitution, and
are treated equally by the Supremacy Clause.
Treaties are different from federal statutes in obvious ways. Most
important for our purposes, they are, not an exercise of Congress's
Article I power to legislate in enumerated areas, but of the President's
Article II power, with the advice of the Senate." Alexander Hamilton
called them a unique species of power that is neither legislative nor
executive in nature." As my colleague Brian Havel notes, "the
international treaty... represents a conscious departure from the
domestic route to legislation."26 Treaties contain, as Vazquez notes,
structural safeguards that do not exist with respect to statutes.27 Thus at
the very least we can say that in the plan of the convention, treaties were
not viewed as simply another species of legislation, and were assigned a
separate and even unique role in the constitutional structure. The extent
to which this separate role dictates separate abrogation rules is the
question that should be debated. There is ample evidence that the states'
refusal to enforce treaties was "not only important in shaping
constitutional reform [after the Articles of Confederation] but of
overwhelming significance."28 There is evidence that, whether or not the
federal government was to have exclusive power over foreign affairs, 9
24. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV,
389, 458 (1998) (arguing that the same federalism limitations should be imposed on the treaty
power as are imposed on Congress's Article I power).
25. See Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L.
REv. 257, 331 n.289 (2000) (citing the Federalist No. 75).
26. Id. at 331. Havel notes that treaties differ from legislation in at least three respects: "they
are approved by only one House of Congress (the Senate); they cannot be adopted by Congress
without the President's consent; and they assume the participation of foreign countries in the
United States law-making process." Id. at 332.
27. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 722-23, 725.
28. FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986), quoted in Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 2095, 2119 (1999).
29. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002) (pointing out that state courts are permitted to enforce treaties, and that
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the states were intended to play a subservient role in that arena.3
Vazquez considers these and other arguments, suggesting that in the
original plan, states were not meant to have the latitude to determine
whether or not treaties were enforceable. Ultimately, however, he finds
these arguments wanting in light of the fact that the Supremacy Clause
is the sole means of enforcing treaties, and that it treats them just like
statutes. But his conclusion begs the question of whether other structural
principles were also intended, in the plan of the convention, to
safeguard treaties against state incursion.3'
II. BEYOND THE HYPOTHETICAL: REAL WORLD PROBLEMS WITH
ABROGATION THEORY FOR TREATIES AND STATUTES
Although I have attempted to discuss the narrow question raised in
light of current doctrine, there are serious problems with that endeavor.
Vazquez's discussion illustrates the difficulties of even provisionally
assuming the correctness, or perhaps the very existence, of a stable,
discernible body of current sovereign immunity doctrine-when in fact
many of those boundaries are shifting and contested. As Vazquez
himself has been instrumental in explaining, current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine is deeply schizophrenic.32 In an article explaining
this schizophrenia, he described "two distinct and conflicting analytical
strains,"33 a "supremacy" strain that stresses the practical insignificance
of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and a "state sovereignty" strain that
views the Eleventh Amendment as standing for a vital and important
principle that must be safeguarded, even at the cost of remedying
governmental wrongs.34
Vazquez rests much of his argument for treating statutes like treaties
on their equal treatment in the Supremacy Clause, and on the primacy of
that clause as a means of ensuring an acceptable level of state
there is no guarantee of federal uniformity in treaty interpretation).
30. Kenneth C. Randall, Foreign Affairs in the Next Century, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2105
(1991) (reviewing LOtS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(1990)).
31. For arguments that other structural principles were so intended, see, e.g., Havel, supra
note 25, at 330-31, and David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1089-
1100 (2000).
32. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
859 (2000).
33. Id. at 859.
34. Id. at 859-60.
20021
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compliance with federal law.35 But this argument will take different
shapes depending on which strain of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence is employed.
A. The Supremacy Strain
The supremacy strain assumes a utilitarian calibration of remedies,
some sort of conscious effort to ensure that state autonomy is not
achieved at the expense of too little remediation.36 According to this
theory, the existence and efficacy of remedies is an essential' part of the
scope of the doctrine itself. That is, the doctrine will operate to ensure
"necessary judicial means to assure compliance" with federal
obligation."
Such a rule requires, as Vicki Jackson has pointed out, some baseline
measure of what constitutes adequate remediation.3 To arrive at such a
measure requires, in turn, a discussion of the very structural principles
we discussed earlier. How much governmental accountability, how
much state autonomy, is the constitutional structure designed to
safeguard? What notion of sovereignty does it seek to protect? It
requires a means of measuring whether adequate remediation, however
quantified, is occurring.39 It may also require a discussion of treaties
separate from statutes. For example, if the Constitution is meant to
avoid concentrations of power, does the unique Executive-Senate
ratification process raise questions different from those raised by
bicameral Congressional enactments? Does the participation of foreign
35. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 733.
36. See Jackson, supra note 20, at 986-87 (noting and questioning this assumption in
Vazquez's work).
37. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 718 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
38. See Jackson, supra note 20, at 986-87.
39. This will inevitably be a contested measure. For example, in his article What is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997), Vazquez expresses the view that sovereign
immunity doctrine, to the extent it bars suit against the entity but permits suits against individual
officials, merely precludes vicarious liability, since "government liability is always vicarious
liability, as governments, like corporations, are a legal fiction...." Id. at 1804 (citing Larry
Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987
SUP. CT. REV. 249 (1987)). 1 would argue that this formulation misapprehends the nature of
governmental liability, and the important ways in which it reaches the entity and its systemic
constitutional violations, as opposed to the actions of individual employees. See Susan Bandes,
Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1330-31 (1999);
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2320-23 (1990);
see also Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1016-17 (2000) (critiquing Alden decision and arguing for
superiority of enterprise liability).
[Vol. 42:743
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governments in treaties, or the effect of violating treaties on our nation's
place in the world, change the autonomy/accountability balance?"
Given the increasing possibility of overlap between treaties and
domestic law,4 what role should federalism play when state law
threatens national compliance with international treaty negotiations and
obligations?42
The inquiry must also extend to the current application of those other
doctrines that are claimed to ameliorate the harshness of abrogation
doctrine, particularly the doctrine of Ex parte Young.43 With regard to
Ex parte Young, I think Vazquez is unduly sanguine about its continued
ability to safeguard the Supremacy Clause. Although it could once be
said with some assurance that the doctrine was meant to safeguard the
supremacy of federal law,44 cases like Seminole Tribe and Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,45 or at least language in those decisions,
bode ill for continued broad reliance on its use. As these cases make
clear, the Ex parte Young doctrine, like the abrogation doctrine, is
applied in an increasingly clause-bound manner. That is, whether it
safeguards the supremacy of federal law will depend on the source of
the law.46 It may be evolving into a narrower utilitarian rule solely
40. Vazquez notes that violations of treaties adversely affect a nation's reputation for keeping
its promises, and may also subject the nation as a whole to retaliation. Vazquez, supra note 3, at
729. As Robert Wright recently argued, not only the balance of states versus federal sovereignty,
but the scope of national sovereignty itself, must be debated anew in light of the importance of
international treaties to the effort to address modern global threats to our security as a nation. See
Robert Wright, America's Sovereignty in a New World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at A31.
41. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 31
(1995-96). For recent examples of arguments that international treaties ought to be applicable in
particular state law contexts, see Maria V. Morris, Racial Profiling and International Human
Rights Law: Illegal Discrimination in the United States, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 207 (2001);
Elizabeth A. Reimels, Playing for Keeps: The United States Interpretation of International
Prohibitions Against the Juvenile Death Penalty-The U.S. Wants to Play the International
Human Rights Game, but Only if it Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 303 (2001).
42. See, e.g., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that
Massachusetts's "Burma Law," which conflicted with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and
which prohibited the state and its agents from purchasing goods or services from anyone doing
business with the Union of Myanmar, was preempted, and its application unconstitutional, under
the Supremacy Clause).
43. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
44. Vicki Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration
of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 512 (1997) (noting that the Pennhurst case cast the
Ex parte Young doctrine as based on the needs of national supremacy).
45. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
46. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (discussing doctrine's
application to Indian Commerce Clause); Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(discussing doctrine's application to Fourteenth Amendment); see also David Shapiro, Wrong
Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 83-84 (1984)
(noting Pennhurst Court's frank acknowledgement of Ex parte Young doctrine's practical purpose
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designed to safeguard the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 or to be used only
when "necessary. 48 It may be evolving from a utilitarian rule meant to
safeguard supremacy into a rule that operates only when the suit is not
"really" against the state. 9 Thus we cannot assume that it will be held to
safeguard supremacy equally for treaties and statutes, or even for all
federal statutes, or even that it will be applied uniformly under any
particular federal statute.
The supremacy strain, with its focus on actual remediation, also
demands an inquiry into how the balance of federal supremacy and state
autonomy works in practice under a particular remedial regime. 0 Here
is another context in which treaties and statutes should not be
automatically equated. The question should be: has state autonomy been
inadequately protected against incursions by treaties or statutes? As to
treaties, Vazquez notes the threat to federalism posed by, for example,
broad and vaguely worded treaties protecting human rights." Yet the
current evidence points away from such a threat. As Jack Goldsmith
observes, the political branches often choose to protect state interests
over foreign relations when the two appear to clash. 2 He notes that
"even when the political branches enact preemptive federal foreign
relations law, they often do so in a manner that reflects the interests of
the states and minimizes intrusions on their prerogatives."" Louis
Henkin similarly observes that the Senate substantially represents the
states against internationalist federal regulation, and has often protected
their interests and adopted their views, 4 as it did, for example, in the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act," which, as Henkin summarizes,
of enforcing supremacy of federal law).
47. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling
of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 45
(1998) (noting Justice Kennedy's suggestion that Milliken v. Bradley can be explained in this
way).
48. See Jackson, supra note 42, at 512 (suggesting that in the Article I context, Ex parte
Young has been reduced to virtually a doctrine of necessity.)
49. Vazquez, supra note 45, at 48; Coeur d'Alene, 512 U.S. at 270.
50. See Bradley, supra note 24, at 442 (arguing that we should examine the way in which the
Senate currently works to protect treaties, and pointing to its changed role in this context since the
time of the Framers).
51. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 723.
52. He offers the example of international human rights treaties to which the President and
Senate, despite international pressures, have consistently attached reservations, understandings
and declarations to ensure they do not preempt inconsistent state law. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1675 (1997) (making these
observations in context of an argument for less judicial supervision of treaties)
53. Id.
54. LoUIS HENKJN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 168 (2d ed. 1996).
55. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (Supp. IV 1998) (establishing World Trade Organization).
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provides:
that the agreement shall not itself violate state law, but requires
an act of Congress to achieve that end. The Act also provides that
the courts may invalidate state law on the ground that it is
inconsistent with the Agreement only in an action brought by the
federal government for that purpose. Congress also provided a
role for the states in the dispute settlement process.5 6
I recognize that as a theoretical matter the "political safeguards"
argument is controversial,57 but my point here is that in evaluating
sovereign immunity doctrine within a utilitarian framework like the
"supremacy strain," one must assess how, in fact, those safeguards have
been working.
An additional practical question arises in this assessment process. As
Vazquez observes, "few treaties address domestic remedies... and even
fewer are so specific as to require remedies against the state itself as
opposed to officials."58 It appears that, as to treaties, the question of
abrogation simply does not come up very often. The problem is far
more immediate in regard to federal statutes. Within just the last five
years, the Court has precluded Congress from abrogating sovereign
immunity, despite its clear intent to do so, under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act,59 the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act,6" the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act,6 the Fair
56. HENKIN, supra note 54, at 169.
57. The well-known argument that federalism is adequately safeguarded by the political
branches was most famously made by Herbert Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1996). A recent prominent article advancing this
position is Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). Henkin relies on this argument in the treaty
context. See Henkin, supra note 52, at 168. Curtis Bradley argues at length against its application
to treaties, though he concedes that in practice Congress has consistently refused to displace state
law with international human rights obligations. See Bradley, supra note 24, at 440-44; Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 108 (2000).
See also John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 197, 197
(1998) (agreeing that the Framers believed in the political safeguards of federalism, but arguing
that they did not consider these safeguards to exclude judicial review). But see Golove, supra note
31, at 1294-99 (arguing for the recognition of the special political protections afforded to state
interests in the treaty-making process).
58. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 742.
59. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 4 (1996).
60. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
61. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
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Labor Standards Act,62 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,63
and the Americans With Disabilities Act. 6' I will not here catalogue the
wide ranging and impressive body of scholarship expressing not just
criticism of but alarm at the Court's increasing willingness to use
sovereign immunity doctrine to override federal law.65
The immediate point I underline here is that if we are to ask how
current sovereign immunity doctrine is working in practice, the answer
is not the same for treaties and statutes. The concerns about treaties
seem at this point largely theoretical. 6' The- concern about statutes is
immediate and serious. Many scholars, and I count myself among them,
believe that the supremacy of federal statutory law is severely
threatened under the current doctrinal regime. As I observed elsewhere:
[The Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence] relies on an
expansive version of sovereign immunity whose claimed
immanence is such that it supersedes the limitations imposed by
the language of the Constitution, and trumps, without any
justification beyond its existence, weighty countervailing
principles like governmental accountability and the supremacy of
federal law. The Court has done much to 'denationalize' [citation
omitted] systematic federal protection of core federal rights, and
has done so without acknowledging that the importance of
according federal protection to such rights ought to be part of the
equation.67
The larger point, however, is one with which I believe Vazquez
62. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
63. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
64. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
65. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 20; Jackson, supra note 20; Weinberg, supra note 20.
66. Bradley, for example, concedes that Congress has been quite protective of state autonomy
in the treaty context, but bases his rejection of the "political safeguards" argument in part on the
speculative concern that the Senate may not continue to act this way in the future. Bradley, supra
note 24, at 444. In addition, as Vazquez acknowledges, "[m]any of the 'treaties' often invoked as
sources of a congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity are actually
congressional-executive agreements." Vazquez, supra note 3, at 725. David Bederman states that
"the number of treaties submitted to the Senate for advice and consent has dwindled, while...
executive agreements have flourished. As of the 1990s, the United States had concluded less than
1500 treaties, while it had entered into over 10,000 executive agreements." DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 166 (2001). See also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive
Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, 964-65 (2001) (noting that "some
of the nation's most important postwar undertakings have taken such a form"). Vazquez explicitly
exempts these congressional-executive agreements from his analysis, recognizing their distinct
constitutional character. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 725. '
67. Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 876
(2001).
[Vol. 42:743
TREATIES AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
would agree. Treaty exceptionalism, or indeed any separate treatment of
treaties, will not address the real question of inadequate remediation for
violations of statutory law.68 If the Court is serious about ensuring
adequate remediation, it must rethink a calibration effort that has gone
seriously awry.
B. The State Sovereignty Strain
There is an even more serious problem with assuming a stable
doctrinal framework for this discussion of treaties and
statutes-specifically, the very schizophrenia Vazquez identifies. What
version of sovereign immunity doctrine are we talking about, exactly?
Though Vazquez expresses concern about the Court's increased
allegiance to the state sovereignty strain,69 he is nevertheless too
optimistic about the continued existence of the supremacy strain. Alden
is simply the most recent and most emphatic statement of the Court's
deeply held belief that sovereign immunity is a deep, structural, first
order principle that must be protected irrespective of whether it leaves
an injured party remediless.7" This belief permeates the Court's
increasingly aggressive applications of sovereign immunity doctrine to
bar Congressional abrogation, and is becoming more and more visible
in its steady contraction of the doctrine of Ex parte Young.7"
If indeed sovereign immunity law now rests, or increasingly rests, on
this uncompromising principle, what lessons should we draw for the
question Vazquez posed: whether treaties have more power than statutes
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment? As he recognizes, if I may put
the matter colloquially, at that point the difference between treaties and
statutes becomes the least of our problems. A doctrine that does
violence to our ability to enforce the rule of law or guarantee the
supremacy of federal law against state government is itself a threat to
our sovereignty as a nation-albeit a threat with domestic origins. As
68. See generally Vazquez, supra note 3.
69. Id. at 25 ("Of greater concern is language in some recent decisions suggesting that the
Court is departing from the [Supremacy] view...").
70. See Jackson, supra note 20, at 953 (critiquing expansion of sovereign immunity into a
first order principle); see also Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on
Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1144 (2000) (referring to
Court's "reverential" attitude toward sovereign immunity); Matthew Mustokoff, Sovereign
Immunity and the Crisis of Constitutional Absolutism: Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment after
Alden v. Maine, 53 ME. L. REV. 81, 83 (2001) (referring to recent cases culminating in Alden as
"broaden[ing] the Eleventh Amendment from a procedural rule of narrow, precise application to
an overriding, absolute principle of state sovereign immunity ... [a] fundamental, unwavering
precept of universal recognition").
71. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
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Kenneth Randall observed, ours is not only a constitutional system, but
a democratic one, in which "individuals retain the rights the government
should secure, even against their representatives in government. '72 On
this broad question, at least, Vazquez and I appear to agree. If this is an
accurate description of our current situation, it cannot be solved through
half-measures. Current sovereign immunity doctrine itself must be
rethought in light of the principles undergirding our aspirations for a
"more perfect union."73
72. Randall, supra note 30, at 2100.
73. See Louis Henkin, Silbey Lecture, Human Rights and State 'Sovereignty,' March 1994,
reprinted in adapted form at 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31 (1995-96) ("in the United States, We
the People asserted sovereignty not to maintain their natural liberty ('sovereignty') so as to be
free from government, but to form and consent to a "more perfect union.").
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